Press TV footage of the Battle of Donetsk Airport from the view of the separatist infantry and artillery.
Press TV footage of the Battle of Donetsk Airport from the view of the separatist infantry and artillery.
On the evening before the thirteenth anniversary of 9/11, President Barack Obama outlined his strategy “to degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS. He started his speech by noting that while terrorism can be mitigated, it cannot be totally eliminated. Transitioning to ISIS, he described the organization as not being “Islamic” and not being a state. The President then noted what makes ISIS so unique – its sheer brutality, its ability to hold territory, and its attraction for foreign fighters. Then, he described current American foreign policy actions against ISIS, including airstrikes against the terrorist group in Iraq and building coalitions with partners in the Middle East. Thus, the Commander-and-Chief described the previous actions of the U.S. against ISIS in Iraq.
The President then pushed a new initiative, “a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy,” in the Middle East. He subdivided this strategy into four parts. The first part of the plan is to “conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes” against ISIS in Iraq and now Syria. The next part is to increase military support for the Syrian opposition. He also authorized the deployment of 475 more troops to Iraq to build up their forces, raising the total number of American military personnel there to 1,600 troops. The third part of the strategy is to employ threat mitigation techniques to detect and to deter ISIS attacks on the U.S. Homeland. The final part of the plan is to provide humanitarian aid to displaced persons in Iraq and Syria. President Obama emphasized that this plan had international support as well as bipartisan support in Congress. Thus, the strategy President Obama outlined had four parts – airstrikes against ISIS, military support for the Syrian opposition, counterterrorism to protect the U.S. Homeland, and providing humanitarian aid for civilians.
President Obama concluded his speech by attempting to strengthen the U.S.’s morale for as sustained counterterrorism campaign. The Commander-and-Chief then vowed any action in Syria or Iraq would “not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil.” He then noted his multilateral approach stating, “Use force against anyone who threatens America’s core interests, but to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges.” He then noted the history of 9/11 and the Great Recession, but then noted America is still a leader on the global stage – including that America “rallied the World against Russian aggression,” led the struggle in containing Ebola, and removed Syrian WMDs. He concluded the speech with the motivating words, “Our endless blessings bestow an enduring burden. But as Americans, we welcome our responsibility to lead.” President Obama sought to rally the crowd by portraying ISIS as an expanding evil while stressing America’s role in the international community.
The speech was commendable in seeks to degrade and destroy ISIS; however, several key actors and factors were ignored. President Obama did not mention the Kurds or the peshmerga at all, and they are responsible shareholders in a multiethnic Iraq’s future. Furthermore, 20,000 foreign fighters have or are currently fighting in Syria. Of these 20,000, 100 fighters are American passport holders. Of these 100, at least a dozen are fighting for ISIS. These foreign fighters can easily become terrorists, and need to be monitored and tracked. Additionally, ISIS has executed Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff, causing me to question whether the American government has reviewed its policy of hostage negotiations with terrorists. Another point of concern is over whether the U.S. – specifically the CDC – has the resources to deal with an ISIS biological attack in the form of the bubonic plague – as files were retrieved from an ISIS computer suggesting a cell was looking into using this technique. While the change of strategy in Syria and Iraq will be more proactive in countering ISIS, it is not enough to guarantee the safety of the American Homeland.
“U.S. Department of Defense
September 2, 2014
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room
Presenter: Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby
September 02, 2014
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN KIRBY: Afternoon everybody. A couple of things to open up. First, I know we’ve all seen press reporting about the potential murder by ISIL of Mr. Sotloff. I don’t have anything to confirm it today. Obviously, we’re monitoring as best we can, and our thoughts and prayers continue to go out to the Sotloff family, who has endured incredible hardship and suffering just by virtue of his captivity and being held hostage, but I can’t confirm those press reports right now.
Number two, I know that you’ve all been tracking events in Somalia last night. So if you’ll just bear with me, I’m going to walk you through what I can right now. Yesterday, at approximately 11:20 Eastern Time, working from actionable intelligence, U.S. special operations forces using manned and unmanned aircraft destroyed an encampment and a vehicle using several Hellfire missiles and laser-guided munitions.
This operation was a direct strike against the Al-Shabaab network, specifically the group’s leader, Ahmed Abdi al-Muhammad, also known Ahmed Godane. We are still assessing the results of the operation, and we’ll provide additional information when and if appropriate. And I’m not going to be able to provide specifics about the unit or the intelligence itself, and certainly not anything regarded to tactics, techniques and procedures.
The operation occurred south of Mogadishu, located in south-central Somalia, and it did result in the destruction of that vehicle. I think it’s important to remind everybody that in September 2013, Godane publicly claimed Al-Shabaab was responsible for the Westgate Mall attack, which killed and injured dozens in Nairobi.
Under the leadership of Godane, Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings, including suicide attacks in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting officials and perceived allies of the federal government of Somalia, as well as the former transitional federal government of Somali.
A militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, Al-Shabaab has occupied most of southern Somalia since 2006 and claimed responsibility for the deaths of numerous government officials, aid workers, peace activists, and journalists. Named a foreign terrorist organization by the Department of State in February 2008, Al-Shabaab has conducted terrorist activities in the region that have resulted in the loss of much innocent life.
They’ve also continued to plan plots targeting westerners, including U.S. personnel in East Africa. In recent months, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Djibouti that killed a Turkish national and wounded several Western soldiers, as well as a car bomb at the Mogadishu Airport that targeted and killed members of the United Nations convoy.
So the operation that we’ve conducted, we believe, is an example of the U.S. government and our allies’ and partners’ commitment to the people and government of Somalia to detect, deter, disrupt and defeat violent extremists who threaten progress in the region, as well as to threaten — as well as threaten to conduct terrorist attacks against innocent people around the world. And we’re going to continue to use all the tools at our disposal — financial, diplomatic, intelligence, and of course, the military — to dismantle Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups who threaten U.S. interests, as well as the interests of our allies and our partner nations.
And then one final comment I’d like to make on Iraq. As you know, over the weekend, at the request of the Iraqi government, the United States military air-dropped humanitarian aid to the town of Amerli, home to thousands of Shia Turkmen who have been cut off — or had been cut off from receiving food, water, and medical supplies for two months by ISIL.
The U.S. Air Force delivered this aid alongside aircraft from Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, who also dropped much-needed supplies. In conjunction with this air drop, U.S. aircraft conducted coordinated airstrikes against nearby ISIL terrorists in order to support this humanitarian assistance operation and thereby helped facilitate the actual delivery of the aid.
While we continue to monitor the situation in Amerli, at this time we assess that Iraqi and Kurdish forces are in control of the township and are providing for the security needs of the citizens there. So further strikes remain a possibility, of course, but we believe that the township is under the control of Iraqi and Kurdish forces.
And as we’ve said before, one of our core military objectives in Iraq is to join with international partners to address humanitarian crises. And where and when we have the ability to do that, we’re going to do it.
With that, I’ll take questions.
QUESTION: Admiral, on the Somalia issue, would you describe the target as a single target encampment and a single vehicle? Or were there two strikes or two targets? Was there just one vehicle?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: There was one vehicle and an encampment. So the way I would describe it is kind of the way I laid it out in the opening. The strike was taken at an encampment and a vehicle. That was at the encampment.
Q: So one strike? Single?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: What do you mean by strike? One missile? No. As I said, several Hellfire missiles, as well as precision-guided munitions, so there were — there was plural, in terms of munitions, dropped, but they were dropped on one target, an encampment where a vehicle was — was nearby.
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Go ahead.
Q: And was there any evidence afterwards that anyone survived?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, we’re assessing the results right now, Bob, and that’s — that’s where I’m just not going to be able to go right now. I’m not going to get into trying to assess the effectiveness. We certainly believe that we hit what we were aiming at. And based on intelligence that, as I said, we believe was actionable, in other words, strong enough, we — we took this strike, but I wouldn’t get into assessing the effectiveness right now.
Q: So you’re confident Godane was there?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I’m just not going to get into assessments right now, Bob. I think I’d like to leave it kind of where I did right now. When — you know, if and when — as I said earlier, and I said last night — if and when, you know, we have more information that we can share, we certainly will.
Q: You said that there were laser-guided munitions. Does that mean that there were U.S. forces on the ground to lase the targets?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: There were no U.S. forces on the ground.
Q: No U.S. forces, either before or after the strikes?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: No U.S. strikes on the ground, before or after the strikes.
Q: Was there somebody else on the ground that was lasing the targets?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, all I would tell you is that, you know, we continue to work with partners in that — in Somalia and in the region, but I won’t get any more specific than that.
Q: Admiral, did the U.S. inform the Somali government or the AMISOM mission there about the mission before — before it took place?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I don’t have a tick-tock on the notification process, but this is very much in keeping with the kinds of operations that we conduct throughout the region and in partnership with the — you know, with the leadership there.
Q: And do you know the Somalia government announced last month this new mission, Operation Indian Ocean, about combatting Al-Shabaab and particularly targeting their access to ports, to seize off their sources of revenue. Was this strike in conjunction with that operation?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Not to my knowledge.
Q: You speak of it as if Godane was killed, but I know you won’t speak to that specific question right now. But if he were to be killed, what do you think it would say about the group’s — what would it mean for the group going forward? How important would that be?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, again, without speculating about whether he was, in fact, killed or not, I mean, he is the recognized, appointed leader of the Al-Shabaab network in Somalia. So if he was killed, this is a very significant blow to their network, to their organization, and, we believe, to their ability to continue to conduct terrorist attacks.
Now, mind you, it’s a network, and we understand that. And we’re mindful that there are — there remain other leaders of the organization at large. But he’s the recognized leader. And if we killed him, a significant blow to their organization and to their abilities.
Q: Thank you, admiral. More broadly, can you answer the critics who are saying that the administration does not have a strategy, does not have a counterterror strategy, a Mideast strategy, one that’s good enough? Is there a strategy? Can you articulate that strategy for us and answer those critics?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Absolutely there’s a strategy for our approach to the Middle East. Now, I can only speak from a military perspective and for the Pentagon, but we have been consistently going after the terrorist threat in that part of the world, and not just that part of the world, as I just — as I just read to you.
And inside Iraq, the mission is very clear. We are there to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces as they take the fight to ISIL. We are there to provide humanitarian assistance where and when we can. I just — we just talked about that over the weekend. And we are certainly there to help defend and protect U.S. personnel and facilities.
So the mission set inside Iraq is very, very clear. The strategy, with respect — the military strategy, with respect to the Middle East, also has been very clear, and it’s not just something that — you know, that we just started doing. I mean, we’ve been — we’ve been going after terrorist networks in that part of the world for more than a decade, with — with very good success. Doesn’t mean it’s been eliminated, but we certainly have been very active and very energetic, and the objectives have been very, very clear.
Q: Do you feel that you’ve gone after ISIS as soon as you possibly could? The question is, how good and how early was the intelligence that was being briefed to the White House about the ISIS threat? And could more have been done sooner, I guess?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, I’m not going to speak about intelligence matters, and I’m certainly not going to speak for intelligence issues that were raised to the White House. That’s a question better directed to the intelligence community and to them.
But wait a minute. But to your larger issue here, we’ve talked about ISIL for many months now. And as I’ve said before, we were very closely monitoring and tracking their progress, their growth, their development, well before they rolled in to Mosul. So this is not an organization that we haven’t been watching.
The speed with which they took control of the north in Iraq definitely got a lot of people’s attention. And I’ve said that publicly, too. Nobody expected that four divisions of the Iraqi army were just going to fold the way they did. So there was a speed there that certainly was — did not go unnoticed.
But this is an organization we’ve been long watching, and I think it’s helpful to go back and just look at the last couple of months. I mean, we’re all fixated right now on targeted air strikes, which we are conducting with very good tactical effect, but long before that started, we upped our presence in the Persian Gulf, we added more security assistance personnel in and around Baghdad. We stood up two joint operations centers, which are active and helping right now, as we speak, in terms of advising and assisting and sharing information with Iraqi and Kurdish forces. And then we have done numerous air drops in two different operations to alleviate suffering. So the military has been very active here.
The other thing that we’ve said, Justin — and is this not a small point — is there’s not going to be just a military solution here. Ultimately, the long-term answer has to be inclusive, responsible, responsive, good governance inside Iraq to alleviate, to help take away those conditions that folks like ISIL can exploit for their own purposes.
Does that answer your question?
Q: (off-mic) yeah, just a quick follow-up on Justin’s question. As you may know, the majority of the foreign fighters who are joining ISIL are going to Syria through Turkey. My question is, how do you evaluate Turkey’s role in countering ISIS?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, it’s not for me to evaluate Turkey’s role…
Q: Based on — based on your information, do you think Turkey is cooperating?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: We have a strong relationship with…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: No, I know that. I’m not going to — I’m not going to — you know, I’m not going to answer a question that should be asked of the Turkish government. What I’m telling you is, Turkey has a stake here. We understand that. It’s an important partner in the region, a NATO ally. The Turkish government has concerns about foreign fighters, and right they should, and we’re going there next week, and I think — I have no doubt that this will be a topic of discussion between Secretary Hagel and his counterpart.
Q: Do you think they’re doing a — a helpful…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Do I think what?
Q: Do you think they are doing a helpful role?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: A helpful role. We believe that Turkey, because they have concerns just like other partners in the region, are — are expending their effort and their energy in trying to address this as best they can. I’m not going to go into more detail than that.
Q: Could you give us a clear picture of the situation on the ground at the Mosul dam? Why the United States
keeps launching airstrikes at that location?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Because ISIL keeps trying to take it back. As I said last week, as long as they continue to pose a threat to the facility, we’re going to continue to hit them. And we are.
Q: Admiral, on the subject of the secretary’s trip, Secretary Kerry wrote in the New York Times over the weekend that he and Secretary Hagel will be asking NATO allies and other nations for help in this potential campaign against ISIS in Syria. How much more can you tell us about how many nations they’re going to approach, which ones, and what they’ll ask for specifically in building that coalition?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I think we’re still sort of putting together an agenda here, Phil, for — on the sidelines of the NATO summit. But you’re right. Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry do want to get together with some of these partner nations. Many of them are NATO allies, of course. And I don’t have a list right now.
I think this is going to be more of an informal arrangement, again, on the sidelines of the already very full agenda in Wales, wherein they will try to get together and talk about the contributions that have been made by these other nations, and certainly to encourage others who haven’t contributed yet to look at contributing, as well. But, I mean, I don’t — I don’t have a date certain on the calendar or a time when they’re going to do that, but we’re looking for those opportunities.
And it could be more than one. It could be that, you know, they — that they have these discussions in more than one setting with smaller numbers of these nations at a time.
Q: Can you give us a high-level sense about what they’ll ask for? Do they want partners for airstrikes? Do they want humanitarian aid like you described earlier, somewhere in between? What will they ask for?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: We want partner nations to contribute what they are able and willing to contribute in whatever fashion they’re willing to contribute it. And understanding, of course, that they have domestic concerns, as well, and their own legislative bodies to work through on this, and populations who have, you know, different views on assisting against the ISIL threat. We respect that.
So it’s not about going there with demands or a laundry list. It’s about going there to thank them for what they’ve been doing, encourage them to continue to assist in whatever way they deem fit.
Q: Thank you. If I can go back to Somalia, you had mentioned that you were mindful of some of other leaders that were in the area, and I was wondering — because we have officials in Somalia saying that it was a senior Al-Shabaab meeting. Do you know of any other targets — without saying whether or not they were hit, were there any other targets that were at that encampment?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: We’re still assessing the results. What I would tell you is the principal target was Mr. Godane. And we’re still assessing the results. And, again, if we have more information about others who may have been killed in that attack, we’ll certainly share it as best we can.
Q: And you said — just a quick follow-up — you said that there was an unmanned and a manned attack. Was the actual hit, was it by a drone? Or was it by the manned aircraft?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: What I said was manned and unmanned aircraft participated in the strike. I didn’t actually say what type of aircraft launched these — these missiles and precision-guided munitions, and I won’t get into detailing the platforms here today.
Yeah, Maggie? Maggie?
Q: Okay. Do you consider the operation at Amerli to be a success? And if so, how is the Defense Department defining success when it comes to those operations which target the Islamic State? At Mount Sinjar, there was a potential rescue operation that the U.S. military was looking at and decided not to do. And the intelligence indicated there were 2,000 people on the mountain that wanted off. And then you just said the Islamic State was trying to retake Mosul dam. So I’d just like some clarity on what success looks like for this campaign.
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I don’t know that I would call it a campaign. But leaving that aside, we do believe that the operations in Amerli have been successful. I mean, obviously, as I said, Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces are now in — are in control of the township. We’re watching that. We’re monitoring that. We’re not taking that for granted.
Just like to Joe’s question on the Mosul dam, if we need to continue to take strikes in and around Amerli to disrupt ISIL, we’ll do that. But so far, we believe the mission has succeeded and, by and large, because we’re able to get needed provisions to the — to the people there. And we know that it got into the right hands and that they’ve been able to sustain themselves with the food and water that’s been provided.
And I should remind you that it wasn’t just us doing this. As I said, there were other countries involved in that, and we’re grateful for that support.
The president also has been very, very clear about — from an anti-ISIL perspective — what we’re trying to do there, and it’s to disrupt their ability to continue to put U.S. personnel and facilities at risk or to further spur more humanitarian crises.
But ultimately — and we’ve also said — so this is to your question about success — that the real measure of success is that their ideology is ultimately defeated, and the only way that’s going to be done is through good governance. And we’ve said that time and again, but I think it’s worth repeating. There’s not going to be a military solution to this. We’re not the answer to ISIL inside Iraq, not the U.S. military. The answer is the ideology gets rejected because there’s good governance, responsive government, inclusive government in Iraq and, frankly, in Syria, as well.
Did that answer your question? Yes, ma’am?
Q: Is there any — before this video was released today of Steven Sotloff’s murder, was there any indication or suspicion that he was killed at the same time as James Foley?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I don’t know that anybody had definitive knowledge one way or the other. And as I would say — and I’d remind you that we still can’t confirm the press reporting about this next video and this potential new murder. So I — I wouldn’t be able to characterize it one way or another that we knew. We’re trying to — just like you, we’re trying to find out ground truth here.
Q: (off-mic) on the Shabaab operation, was there any intelligence that they were plotting an imminent terrorist attack? Was that one of the reasons why this action was taken when it was?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I think I laid it out in my opening. This action was taken because of the history of terrorist attacks and violence that this organization is responsible for and continues to be responsible for. But, again — and I will just tell you, actionable intelligence led us to that site where we believe he was. But I wouldn’t talk about the specifics of exactly what that intelligence was composed of.
Q: Admiral, I was wondering if you might be able to bring us up to speed on your latest understanding of the size and scope of Russian troop levels, both on the border with Ukraine and inside Ukraine? And separately, has the secretary had any chance to talk to his Russian counterpart in the last couple days about the escalating situation there?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Sure. He’s not spoken to Minister Shoygu since the last team I read it out to you, which was, I think, more than a week ago. We continue to assess that Russian forces aggregate along the border with Ukraine. I’m loathe, as I typically am, to get into a hard number, but it’s certainly north of 10,000, remains north of 10,000.
More important than the numbers are, as I said, the capability. These are battalion tactical groups that are highly capable, very ready, very close to the border, closer than we saw in the spring, and could move literally on a moment’s notice.
In addition to that, we continue to see support for separatists and we continue to see Russian forces, conventional and special forces, inside Ukraine, in the — again, without getting into a specific number, I’d say in the thousands is safe. And nothing has changed about our position, that that activity needs to stop, those troops need to leave, the support for the separatists needs to stop, and we want those troops pulled away from the border with Ukraine.
So we — again, we continue to see action by Moscow that does nothing but increase tensions inside Ukraine and spur additional violence.
Q: Can I follow on that?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Sure.
Q: NATO Secretary General Rasmussen yesterday said he plans to build a NATO rapid response force of some 14,000 troops to put along the eastern borders of the NATO nations in response to Russia’s aggression. How would the U.S. participate in that? Would they provide troops, equipment, support, weapons, air cover? What is the U.S. thinking about that force? And would it engage in that operation?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I think we would certainly participate in any discussion about the development of this rapid reaction force. As you know, we already do field a rapid reaction force — in fact, they just deployed an army unit.
But to your other question, I think we certainly would participate in discussions about that. I have no doubt but that it will be discussed in Wales this week. And Secretary Hagel looks forward to having those discussions. But it’d be preliminary right now, way ahead of ourselves to try to speculate exactly how we would assist in resourcing that force.
The bigger point, Mick, is that we’re continuing to look for ways to work with allies and partners in the region to bolster the security commitments that we already have in Europe and to reiterate our absolute ironclad commitment to Article 5 of the treaty.
And there’s lots of ways to do that. We’ve contributed to the Baltic air policing mission. We’ve done ground
exercises in the Baltics. We’ve exercised more aggressively in the Black Sea. That continues. So we’re constantly looking for new ways. We welcome the secretary general’s suggestion. And I know we’ll look forward to having deeper discussions about it when we get there.
Q: Does — does the U.S. think that those eastern NATO borders are threatened in the least bit by Russia’s apparent incursion into Ukraine?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: It’s not that there’s a direct threat against the eastern borders of those nations. It’s about making sure that there’s a strong message sent, to friend and foe alike, that we’re going to stand by our Article 5 treaty commitments, and we’re going to — and we have done that, and we will continue to look for ways to stress that again.
Q: Did — so the Ukrainian forces have suffered a little bit more setbacks in recent days in actions against separatists. By some reports, the language from Moscow is increasingly strong. Has that — are you changing your approach to the summit in terms of the urgency of the situation or discussions of what — what the U.S. response might need to be, given — given the changing conditions on the ground, where Russian support for separatists seem to be having more of an effect now?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: From a defense perspective only — and I’m not qualified to speak to everything — it’s not just a defense summit that — or ministerial that we’re going to in Wales — but from a defense perspective, no, nothing essentially changes about the manner in which we continue to monitor the situation, Julian.
So I know of no specific agenda item that’s going to — that has changed because of the last week or so. But, of course, what’s been going on in Ukraine will be a major topic of discussion by all of NATO’s leaders this week.
And it has — as Secretary Hagel has said many times, what Russia has done in many ways has galvanized the alliance and shown into — and brought into sharp relief the need for all NATO partners and allies to continue sufficient and adequate defense spending for their own defense and for the defense of their allies and to look for new ways to combat threats on the continent. But I’m not aware of a specific item.
I think — but if I could just pull back from the summit a little bit, I don’t want to leave you with the impression that we aren’t mindful of the intensity of operations in and around Ukraine right now.
I mean, as Secretary Hagel gets ready to leave for Wales, he’s certainly mindful of what’s going on there and how the alliance has got to be able to prove strong enough to send the right message to Moscow going forward.
I mean, I already got you. Let me look around. Yeah?
Q: Admiral, to follow up on NATO and Ukraine, General Secretary Rasmussen spoke at length and in some detail about this rapid strike force. He said that it would be able to strike in a very, very few days. He spoke about numbers. He said there would have to be prepositioned supplies and facilities in place already, so it could strike fast. He also spoke about it as if it was a done deal.
So my question — and that — you know, the details need to be worked out, but that the concept of it, the foundation of it is a done deal. So my question is, did he get ahead of where the United States is, number one? And, number two, has Secretary Hagel and the Pentagon had input to Mr. Rasmussen and other NATO leaders about the formation of this rapid strike force? Or will they be hearing about it for the first time in Wales?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I don’t think anybody from at least the United States side will be hearing about it for the first time when we get to Wales. As I said, we look forward to having these discussions. It is — it’s another idea that is worth exploring when it comes to, again, standing by our Article 5 commitments. But this is — this will be no doubt part of the discussions when we get to Wales.
Q: And Russia — just a quick follow — Russia today responded — the Russian government responded today, in so many words, saying that this — this would be a provocative move and they would have to reassess their own stance, if NATO was to do this. Do you have concerns about Russia perceiving the creation of such a quick strike force as a provocation?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Our concerns are, again, meeting our commitments to NATO allies and partners. And you want to talk provocative? Let’s talk about a few thousand Russian troops inside eastern Ukraine, continuing to support separatists, with heavy weapon systems, and more than 10,000 troops arrayed along the southeast border with Ukraine. Let’s talk about that; that’s pretty provocative.
And I think that it’s entirely reasonable and prudent and responsible for NATO leaders to look for ways to continue to bolster the security alliance and the commitments that we have on the continent of Europe.
Let’s go back here.
Q: Admiral, I’d like to ask about the Mosul dam situation again. You said a few minutes ago that the reason the airstrikes have continued in that area is because ISIL continues to try to take the dam. I mean, is that — they’re taking offensive maneuvers towards the dam, and the purpose of the airstrikes is to deflect that? Or is the current military policy and strategy some sort of broader denigration of ISIL capability in the area? I guess, in effect, I’m asking, if ISIL was to stand down and not take any offensive measures against the dam, would the U.S. military operations against them in that broader region of northern Iraq stop?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: The best way to answer your question is that we have specific authorities under which we are conducting airstrikes, to protect U.S. personnel and facilities, contribute to ISF and Kurdish efforts to fight ISIL, and, of course, the humanitarian side. So those are the authorities under which we’re conducting airstrikes. Nothing has changed about that.
And as we talked about when the Mosul dam operations started, that we believed that that was not only for the humanitarian purpose, but also it contributed to the protection of U.S. personnel and facilities. And so as long as ISIL continues to threaten the facility, we’ll continue to strike them. And I think you’ve seen that continue. You guys get the press releases every day. We’re very open and transparent about what we’re hitting, when, and with what. And that will continue, as long as they continue to threaten that facility, because that facility is that important.
Did that answer your question? Did that answer your question?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I mean, the — I think what you’re getting at is, like, is there some sort of broader mechanism or are we playing loose and fast with rules here? And we’re not. There are very specific authorities under which we are conducting strikes.
Q: (off-mic) talk about Al-Shabaab, you used the phrase, you know, deter, disrupt and defeat. And you don’t really use that language when you talk about ISIL. I guess I’m wondering if — right now, the…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I think the president was pretty clear about what the — what the goals are inside Iraq with respect to ISIL, and he did say to disrupt their capability. And we continue to do that. But, look, ultimately, Andrew, it — we’re doing that at a tactical level through these airstrikes. And we’re doing it, quite frankly, I think, you could argue that we’re helping disrupt their capabilities through these humanitarian missions, because we’re denying them what they sought, both with the Yazidis and now these Shia Turkmen living in Amerli.
But strategically, long term, the real answer is good governance. And I know you guys don’t like to hear that. And I know that that doesn’t make for good copy in the Pentagon press room, but that is, in fact, what has to happen. We’re not going to solve this militarily, and we’re not going to solve the threat that ISIL poses just through airstrikes.
Q: Admiral, a clarification, please. I believe you mentioned that an Army unit is moving in Eastern Europe. Is that part of the planned rotation? Is that — is that unit on the first…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: What’s moving — say that again?
Q: You mentioned that an Army unit…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Yeah, I’m afraid I just don’t have the details. We have — we have a NATO response force that’s staffed by the Army, and I can get you more details on this, but it’s a normal rotational deployment.
Q: Because that separate from the 1st Cav, which is replacing…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: No, it’s the 1st Cav. It’s the same — it’s the same unit that we’ve been talking about.
Q: Because the movement of that unit, as best you know, has that been sped up? I believe they were not supposed to start moving until next month.
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I’ll have to get back to you, Richard. I don’t know if they’ve actually accelerated that deployment or not.
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I was — Bob wants me to choose Phil, but I’m going to go with you because Bob wants me to choose Phil. (Laughter.)
Q: Thank you. Let me briefly change the topic. My question is about Korea. There has been a recent press report that the U.S. military has completed a site survey for the THAAD missile defense system.
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Yeah.
Q: And, you know, China and Russia have expressed strong opposition to this plan. And my question is, is the U.S. military going to go ahead with this deployment, despite these objections?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I don’t have anything for you on that today. We’re in constant consultation with our allies on the peninsula about the requirements to defend the peninsula appropriately, and I just don’t have anything for you today on that.
Q: I just wanted to nail you down a little bit. On the…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Sure.
Q: You said before that the principal target of the Somalia operation was Godane. And you said earlier that you think you got what you were aiming at. I just want to make sure you — if you’re — I wanted to know if you…
REAR ADM. KIRBY: I meant the facility. I meant the — the encampment and the vehicle. That’s what — that’s what we — that’s what we were targeting. I’m not prepared — no, thank you for making me clarify. I’m not —
that wasn’t a subtle hint that we think we know we got Godane.
Again, guys, we’re assessing this. And when we have information that we can share with you, we certainly
I got time for one more. Yeah, Jon?
Q: Admiral Kirby, are there any specific deliverables that Secretary Hagel is hoping to come out of this NATO summit, either in terms of a NATO response to Russian activities in Ukraine or against ISIL?
REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, remember, John, this isn’t a defense ministerial. This is a NATO summit of heads of state. So it’s not for Secretary Hagel to — you know, to have specific, you know, deliverables coming in and out of it. I mean, he’s looking forward to participating in the discussions with Secretary Kerry and with the president.
One of the things we do want to accomplish — and this gets to Phil’s question — is we do want to talk to some of our allies and partners about additional things that can be done inside Iraq. That’s clear. He looks forward to meeting with many of his counterparts to talk about not just what’s going on in Russia and Ukraine, but also Afghanistan. And should Afghanistan send a representative — right now, it appears as if they might — he’ll look forward to having those discussions, as well.
But ultimately, writ large, this is a — this is a — as he’s said, this is a defining moment for the alliance. And this’ll — this summit provides the alliance a great opportunity to look not only at what’s been happening in the last few months in Russia and Ukraine, but the future of the alliance itself, from defense spending to operations to exercises to interoperability and capabilities across the spectrum of military operations.
By Tyrone C. Marshall Jr. | DOD News | 21 July 2014
This article was originally published on the Defense Department website on July 18.
Washington — Although it’s unclear who is helping separatists fighting in Ukraine and how much help is being provided, there are no indications that Russia has stopped its support, the Pentagon press secretary, Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby, said July 18.
During a Pentagon news conference, Kirby discussed the need for Russia to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine and its potential involvement in the July 17 crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.
“We see no hint that Russian support for the separatists has ceased,” he said. “In fact, we believe that Russia continues to provide them with heavy weapons and other military equipment — financing as well,” the admiral said. “They continue to allow these Russian fighters to enter Ukraine freely.” Some tanks and personnel vehicles have made their way across the border, he added.
“It has been a steady, concerted campaign by Russia’s military to continue to support, resource [and] advise these separatists,” he said.
Kirby noted while there isn’t specific evidence that an SA-11 surface-to-air missile crossed the border into Ukraine, “we’re not ruling anything in or out at this point.”
“The missile itself, the SA-11, which is the one we believe was used to down Flight 17, is a sophisticated piece of technology,” he said. “It strains credulity to think that [the separatists] could do this without some measure of Russian support and assistance.”
The admiral said “we want to let investigators do their work” to discern whether assistance includes Russian troops going across the border to act side by side with separatists to train and advise them.
“We do not have any reason to suspect that they have not provided some measure of support on the other side of that border,” Kirby said. “These paramilitary forces that we do not talk about as much anymore certainly did not act or behave or organize resources like some ragtag militia.”
Kirby emphasized he is not suggesting that Russian military advice and assistance has not somehow crossed the border, but that it is “just unclear exactly how much and when and who.”
“That is what the investigators are going to look at, and that is what we need to let them do,” he said.
Kirby also said he was unaware of any major changes to Russian military presence in the region.
“It’s roughly still about 10,000 to 12,000,” he said. “And it fluctuates a little bit from week to week, but the point is that it has been, over time, a steady increase of these combined arms tactical battalions across the border on the Russian side, but to the southeast of Ukraine.
“And they are close to the border — in many cases, closer than those forces who were more aligned right on the east,” he added. Tens of thousands were along the eastern border with Ukraine, he said, but not as close as these units appear to be.
The Russian military presence is further escalating tension, he said, and while it’s difficult to know what the intent is, the numbers are growing week by week.
Kirby said the Defense Department is “taking it seriously, and we’ve been monitoring the situation there as closely as we can.”
“Nobody in the Pentagon has been shy about talking about the continued threat posed by these separatist elements inside Ukraine, or frankly, by those combined arms forces that continue to amass along the border,” he said.
Kirby said Pentagon officials continue to review requests for Ukrainian military assistance, and the support continues to flow.
“The focus of that remains on the nonlethal side right now,” he said, “and some [of the] $33 million that the president has authorized of material has been getting to Ukrainian armed forces and border services.”
Recent deliveries include radios, body armor, individual first aid kits, sleeping mats, uniform items,” Kirby said. “Over the next few months,” he added, “additional items will start moving through the procurement process, to include night-vision goggles, thermal imagers, Kevlar helmets, explosive ordnance disposal robots and some additional radios.”
Other equipment has been given to Ukraine’s border guards, the admiral said, such as barbed wire, alarm systems, excavators, trucks, generators and communications gear.
Despite continuing to see “escalatory and dangerous” support from Russia to the separatists — which Kirby said “needs to stop” — the admiral also re-emphasized President Obama’s point that there will not be a U.S. military resolution.
“The president has been very clear from the outset that there’s not going to be a U.S. military solution here to the crisis in Ukraine,” he said. “What we’ve been doing has been efforts to … reinforce and support our NATO allies and partners in the region.”
Officials are looking for ways to improve interoperability and capability, he said, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which states that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all.
“And that’s what you’re going to continue to see us do,” Kirby said.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
July 16, 2014
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON FOREIGN POLICY
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
5:44 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everybody. I want to briefly discuss the important actions we’re taking today in support of Ukraine. Before I do, I want to take a few minutes to update the American people on some pressing foreign policy challenges that I reviewed with Secretary Kerry this afternoon.
First of all, I thanked Secretary Kerry and our outstanding civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan for their success in helping to break the impasse over the presidential election there. Thanks to their efforts and, of course, thanks to the Afghans and the courage of the two candidates, both of whom I spoke to last week, the candidates have agreed to abide by the results of a comprehensive and internationally supervised audit that will review all the ballots, and to form a unity government. If they keep their commitments, Afghanistan will witness the first democratic transfer of power in the history of that nation.
This progress will honor both candidates who have put the interests of a united Afghanistan first, the millions of Afghans who defied threats in order to vote, and the service of our troops and civilians who have sacrificed so much. This progress reminds us that even as our combat mission in Afghanistan ends this year, America’s commitment to a sovereign, united, and democratic Afghanistan will endure –- along with our determination that Americans are never again threatened by terrorists inside of Afghanistan.
Second, John updated me on the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Over the last six months, Iran has met its commitments under the interim deal we reached last year — halting the progress of its nuclear program, allowing more inspections and rolling back its more dangerous stockpile of nuclear material. Meanwhile, we are working with our P5-plus-1 partners and Iran to reach a comprehensive agreement that assures us that Iran’s program will, in fact, be peaceful and that they won’t obtain a nuclear weapon.
Based on consultations with Secretary Kerry and my national security team, it’s clear to me that we have made real progress in several areas and that we have a credible way forward. But as we approach a deadline of July 20th under the interim deal, there are still some significant gaps between the international community and Iran, and we have more work to do. So over the next few days, we’ll continue consulting with Congress — and our team will continue discussions with Iran and our partners –- as we determine whether additional time is necessary to extend our negotiations.
Third, we continue to support diplomatic efforts to end the violence between Israel and Hamas. As I’ve said repeatedly, Israel has a right to defend itself from rocket attacks that terrorize the Israeli people. There is no country on Earth that can be expected to live under a daily barrage of rockets. And I’m proud that the Iron Dome system that Americans helped Israel develop and fund has saved many Israeli lives.
But over the past two weeks, we’ve all been heartbroken by the violence, especially the death and injury of so many innocent civilians in Gaza —- men, women and children who were caught in the crossfire. That’s why we have been working with our partners in the region to pursue a cease-fire — to protect civilians on both sides. Yesterday, Israel did agree to a cease-fire. Unfortunately, Hamas continued to fire rockets at civilians, thereby prolonging the conflict.
But the Israeli people and the Palestinian people don’t want to live like this. They deserve to live in peace and security, free from fear. And that’s why we are going to continue to encourage diplomatic efforts to restore the cease-fire, and we support Egypt’s continued efforts to bring this about. Over the next 24 hours we’ll continue to stay in close contact with our friends and parties in the region, and we will use all of our diplomatic resources and relationships to support efforts of closing a deal on a cease-fire. In the meantime, we’re going to continue to stress the need to protect civilians — in Gaza and in Israel –- and to avoid further escalation.
Finally, given its continued provocations in Ukraine, today I have approved a new set of sanctions on some of Russia’s largest companies and financial institutions. Along with our allies, with whom I’ve been coordinating closely the last several days and weeks, I’ve repeatedly made it clear that Russia must halt the flow of weapons and fighters across the border into Ukraine; that Russia must urge separatists to release their hostages and support a cease-fire; that Russia needs to pursue internationally-mediated talks and agree to meaningful monitors on the border. I’ve made this clear directly to Mr. Putin. Many of our European partners have made this clear directly to Mr. Putin. We have emphasized our preference to resolve this issue diplomatically but that we have to see concrete actions and not just words that Russia, in fact, is committed to trying to end this conflict along the Russia-Ukraine border. So far, Russia has failed to take any of the steps that I mentioned. In fact, Russia’s support for the separatists and violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty has continued.
On top of the sanctions we have already imposed, we are therefore designating selected sectors of the Russian economy as eligible for sanctions. We are freezing the assets of several Russian defense companies. And we are blocking new financing of some of Russia’s most important banks and energy companies. These sanctions are significant, but they are also targeted — designed to have the maximum impact on Russia while limiting any spillover effects on American companies or those of our allies.
Now, we are taking these actions in close consultation with our European allies, who are meeting in Brussels to agree on their next steps. And what we are expecting is that the Russian leadership will see, once again, that its actions in Ukraine have consequences, including a weakening Russian economy and increasing diplomatic isolation.
Meanwhile, we’re going to continue to stand with the Ukrainian people as they seek to determine their own future. Even in the midst of this crisis, they have made remarkable progress these past few months. They held democratic elections, they elected a new president, they’re pursuing important reforms, and they signed a new association agreement with the European Union. And the United States will continue to offer our strong support to Ukraine to help stabilize its economy and defend its territorial integrity because — like any people — Ukrainians deserve the right to forge their own destiny.
So in closing, I’ll point out the obvious. We live in a complex world and at a challenging time. And none of these challenges lend themselves to quick or easy solutions, but all of them require American leadership. And as Commander-in-Chief, I’m confident that if we stay patient and determined, that we will, in fact, meet these challenges.
Thanks very much.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington Foreign Press Center
July 15, 2014
FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH LTG HODGES, COMMANDING GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) ALLIED LAND COMPONENT (LANDCOM)
TOPIC: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) ALLIED LAND COMPONENT (LANDCOM) OPERATIONAL UPDATE
MODERATOR: Hello, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center. Today we have Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges, commanding general of the NATO LANDCOM component. He is here to deliver a NATO Allied Land Component operational update briefing. Without further ado, here is the general. (Applause.)
LTG HODGES: Thanks, (inaudible). Well, first of all, thanks to all of you for coming in today and giving me the opportunity to talk to you briefly about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO, and specifically Allied Land Command, the only land command for the alliance – to give you a quick update on where we are in implementing NATO’s transformation, which was agreed on at the Lisbon summit. And I’m also anxious to talk to you briefly about what Russia is doing in the Ukraine and what NATO – how NATO views that and what the alliance is doing to assure our allies, as well as deter future adversarial actions.
I’d be happy to take the questions that you might have about the alliance. Also, as an American officer – I’m a NATO commander, but I’m serving in NATO in that capacity, and I’d be happy to talk about why it’s important for the United States to remain engaged and provide leadership to the alliance. So that is a range of things that I’m happy to talk about, and I look forward to your questions.
I think it’s important to remember that our alliance is 65 years old. It’s evolved as conditions have changed from what it first was created to do after the end of World War II to now. It’s grown to 28 nations. It’s the most successful alliance in the history of the world. When you think of its membership, nations that fought each other for centuries have not fought each other for the last 65 years. It’s certainly not perfect. We have many things to continue working on so that the alliance remains able to live up to its Article V collective security obligations, but we are continuing to do that, and there’s plenty of evidence that I’d be happy to talk about.
It’s also important to keep in mind that the alliance works hard at remaining relevant as the environment changes. The Lisbon summit was all about making sure that the alliance was going to be capable for life after ISAF. After the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, what did NATO need to be able to do? And it obviously needed to be sustainable. So at Lisbon, the 28 nations agreed to reduce the size of the command structure by a half, and about one-third in terms of the number of positions – so a big cost savings to the nations. The end result is a command structure that includes just one land command – that’s us; we’re based in Izmir, Turkey – one air command that’s in Ramstein, Germany; a maritime command that’s in Northwood, the UK; and then the two joint force commands, of course, in Brunssum and Naples. We all report to the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, SACEUR General Breedlove.
It’s a much flatter, much smaller NATO command structure, which then means that the land forces of the alliance have to be more capable. And that’s why our headquarters was created: to ensure that the land forces of the alliance and the 20 member – partner nations, excuse me – can be more effective and interoperable. So that’s the reason for our headquarters, is to help make sure land forces of the alliance and our partners are effective and interoperable. We’re at a level of effectiveness and interoperability now better than it’s ever been in the last 65 years because of what we’ve been doing together in Afghanistan. Our headquarters has to make sure we don’t lose that as we come out of Afghanistan.
With respect to Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s clearly acting like an adversary. Their actions by the illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilizing activities that they’re conducting on the – off the eastern end of Ukraine clearly are counter to what we all care about. I think there’s – you’ve heard from the Secretary General and from the SACEUR [GEN Breedlove] irrefutable evidence of what Russia is doing to support the pro-separatists in eastern Ukraine. What our headquarters is doing in regards to this is, of course, assisting in the implementation of the assurance measures that the alliance agreed to to make sure that those nations who are closest to potential threats – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria; those nations – that we’re doing things to ensure – to assure them that the rest of the alliance will live up to its Article V obligation. There is no doubt about that, no; we certainly will.
I’ll stop there and look forward to your questions.
MODERATOR: As we move to the Q&A portion of the event, please state your name and publication for the transcript, and wait for the microphone, which could be coming from other side. Please go ahead and ask a question.
QUESTION: Hi. I am Ani Sandu, U.S. correspondent for the Romanian Public Radio, and I would have two questions. First of all, considering Russia’s actions in Ukraine, what kind of measures did you take to prepare in case an Article V intervention is called upon? And second, some countries in Eastern Europe have asked for permanent bases on their territory. Would you favor the establishing of such a base in Romania or Poland?
LTG HODGES: Well, let me take the first one first. Of course, the alliance has increased the amount of aircraft that are involved in the air policing operations up in the Baltics. And they’ve also – we have increased the number of aircraft who are doing air policing over the Black Sea and in Eastern Europe. There are maritime operations, maritime exercises in the Black Sea, with which you’ll be familiar – Operation Breeze, the largest number of NATO ships inside the Black Sea in quite some time, doing an exercise off the coast of Romania and Bulgaria, all within the normal of what’s accepted in the Black Sea and also in accordance with the Montreux Convention. But we’re doing these things to increase readiness and to – again, to assure the allies that are closest to that.
The part that is most relevant to our headquarters is the use of exercises to improve interoperability and to demonstrate the capability of the alliance, that we will, in fact, be there should Romania or any other country in that area ever be attacked or be threatened.
The – I know in Romania the presence of Russian soldiers in Moldova, which have been there for quite some time and the relationship between Moldova and Romania is important. We watch that very closely, but Romania has a fantastic training area at a place called Cincu that American forces go to train there. We anticipate British forces coming there in the fall also to participate in exercises with Romanian forces. The level of interoperability with Romanians is quite high, actually, because of the significant contribution that Romania has made in Afghanistan.
I was just recently in Bucharest and at Cincu and also at Constanta at the other base up there, what’s known as MK. So there is a strong cooperation between Romania and the rest of the alliance, good training facilities, and I would anticipate you would see an increase in training land forces as well as the other forces inside Romania and Hungary and Bulgaria over the next several months.
So that’s the most important thing, I think, from a land perspective, is making sure that the land forces of the alliance are able to work together.
I don’t think – I didn’t answer the second part. Would you say that second part again?
QUESTION: So the second part was some countries in Eastern Europe, including Romania, have asked for permanent bases on their territory. So would you favor the establishing of such a base in Romania or Poland? And how long would it take? If the decision is made, how long would it take for such a base to be established?
LTG HODGES: Well, I think the infrastructure that I alluded to was done with U.S. assistance, helping Romanians develop their own infrastructure, their own capability, so there is a significant amount of infrastructure available to do good training. And also the logistics base and airfield there near Constanta is an important hub for U.S. forces coming out of Afghanistan working their way back. That’s where they go through.
So should it be required, there is high-quality Romanian infrastructure that could be used to support increased training exercises. I think that there’s an internal decision – or national decisions that would have to be made by those eastern European nations. Do they really want to have other forces living there? I’m not sure that that’s – that we know the answer to that yet, or that it’s necessary. What I think is more important is that there is no doubt that the other members of the alliance will be there should Romania be threatened.
QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for your presence here and for answering our questions. Marcus Pindur, German National Public Radio. My first question is: Does NATO have any kind of role in training or assisting the Ukrainian military forces? And could you elaborate – if so, could you elaborate on that? And secondly, you mentioned – actually, it was central to what you said – interoperability was very important and was better than ever. Could you elaborate on that and name a few elements of interoperability that could – have improved and that could further be improved maybe?
LTG HODGES: Okay. No, I’d be glad to. First, congratulations to Germany – (laughter) – (in German). I’m very proud of the United States. I think we stayed closer to you than Brazil did, so we’re very proud of that. But, congratulations.
With Ukraine, there – training and operations with Ukrainian forces has actually been going on for quite some time. We had Ukrainian soldiers that were part of the operations in Iraq. They were under Multinational Division Center South. So we’ve been working the Ukrainians for at least the last 10 or 11 years there, beginning in Iraq. We had Ukrainian personnel operating in Afghanistan. And there’s also – there’s been an exercise series. It’s a multinational exercise co-hosted by Ukraine and the United States called Rapid Trident. It takes place each year in Lviv. So – in fact, I was there last year watching the exercise, and it’s scheduled again this year to take place in mid-September. So this is an exercise that goes on routinely. I don’t want to oversell it in terms of the interoperability as perfect yet, but the purpose of these exercises is to try and make sure we retain the professionalism, the capabilities of Ukrainian armed forces, an important PFP, Partnership for Peace, nation in association with the alliance to assist in the development of their armed forces.
And when you talk about interoperability, I think there are two pillars of interoperability. The first pillar has to do with common standards and procedures, and NATO has a fairly well-documented and developed set of standards for how to do things – procedures in headquarters, operations, almost everything you can imagine, that already exists. So everybody’s got to be able to follow those standards, which requires knowing what they are, and practicing and training.
The second pillar of interoperability, I believe, is communications. In NATO-speak, we would say CIS, Communications and Information Systems. All of your computers, your battle command systems, the screens that track information, all this stuff has got to be interoperable.
The standards part I think we’re actually in pretty good shape because of the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, in the Balkans. It’s generally well-known the – frankly, the European members of the alliance know the standards better than the Americans do. So we’re pretty good there.
The bigger challenge is on CIS, the Communications and Information Systems, because each nation is going to protect its own defense industry, so the nations will buy different systems. And really that’s okay. I don’t care what the label is on the box, whether it’s Telos, Finmeccanica, Raytheon, whatever. What I care about is do the electrons – does the information, the digits, do they match up?
So when you have an Estonian battalion under an American brigade that’s under a German division that’s under a French corps, can they communicate? That’s hard. Technically it’s not hard. You can probably get three teenagers together and they can figure out the technical part. It’s the authorities and policies that need to be addressed to allow that. So we’ve got a little bit of a mismatch between strategic vision and expectations on interoperability and at the lower level actual implementing policies because people are worried about information sharing, who has access to databases and so on. So we’ve got some work to do there.
MODERATOR: Okay, next question.
QUESTION: Hello, my name is Jan Schmitz (ph). I work for Bader Zeitung and five other German newspapers. My question is about Germany, the first one at least. I have two.
Last week, the former vice chairman on the National Intelligence Council Mark Lowenthal was on the PBS NewsHour and he said, and I quote here, “In the view of a lot of senior American officials, they — ” meaning the Germans “– are not alliance worthy.” And he also – that was his translation of “Bündnisfähigkeit”. Is that a feeling that you have encountered in the military community as well? And either way, I think it should affect either your cooperation with the Germans or with the intelligence community in the U.S. That will be my first question.
And the second one on a more broader note is: There is a guideline for the financial commitment that each country should make, and most European countries don’t meet it. Germany is lagging far behind, I think. Is that – how big of a topic is that within your daily operations? Thank you.
LTG HODGES: Okay, thanks. First I’ve never heard anybody ever even hint or suggest or opine that somehow Germany is not alliance-worthy. That’s a ridiculous assertion. They’ve been an essential, very strong member of the alliance for a long time, the third-largest troop-contributing nation in Afghanistan, up in RC North with 5,000 soldiers at the peak, which dwarfed the input of a lot of others.
The quality of officers and noncommissioned officers that Germany provides in my headquarters as well as in other parts of the command structure, they’re as good as anybody there is – very professional, obviously very good equipment. Germany has improved its training facilities there in Germany both in Wildflecken and at – in south of Berlin, which is a new maneuver training center modeled after the American one, which is at Hohenfels. I mean, so Germany has invested in those facilities, and the quality of people that they provide to the alliance from German four-star generals like General Hans-Lothar Domrose, the commander of Joint Force Command Brunssum, or General Werner Freers, the chief of staff at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), who’s my classmate from the War College, by the way, these are exceptional officers.
Should Germany do more? Do I wish they would do more? Absolutely. You’ve got that sort of quality; I would like to see more capacity and I would also like to see Germany be more involved in international exercises to what I see them doing inside Germany and German training areas, I’d like to see them be more involved in the – in those. But those are internal decisions. But obviously, the reason I’d want to see it is because of the quality that they bring. And my sense is that they’re moving in that direction now.
The 2 percent standard for percentage of GDP, I think that’s a good standard, it’s a reasonable standard, and more nations ought to get a whole lot closer to it. Having said that, I think it is important to put in context that there are other things about being an ally that are also very important. Access for the United States – the decision to reduce its footprint overseas, particularly in Europe, significant reduction, is based on a premise that the U.S. will have access to airfields, ports, capabilities in Europe to be able to project power. We cannot take for granted that Germany or Italy or Spain or Turkey will allow U.S. forces just to kind of move in and out of there, or that great base in Romania. So the granting of access – overflight, things like that, sharing of information and intelligence – those are very, very important parts of the alliance.
To be candid, I think that a nation that’s as economically strong as Germany has a leadership obligation. I think that they – clearly, what Germany has done – let me restate it. Germany, Italy, and others have significantly strong ties to Russia, economic ties that go way back – in fact, every nation in the alliance, including my own nation, has economic – has business with Russia, some much more than others. Despite that, all 28 nations have continued to stick together on the implementation of assurance measures, on the implementation of leverage sanctions, on advisers, friends, leaders in Russia.
So there are other parts about being a good ally in addition to “Are you spending enough?” And frankly, I would – I’m just as concerned about what are you spending it on versus just the act of spending – communications systems that are interoperable, modernizing aircraft, having logistical capability – those kind of things, how you spend the money is very important.
QUESTION: To follow up with my German colleague, how do you see the role of France in – oh, I’m sorry, Claude Porsella from Radio France Internationale. How do you see the role of France since France has rejoined the military command? As you know, France is decreasing its military budget, so that’s not going to be very helpful as far as the 2 percent is concerned. But usually speaking, what France role is playing in NATO now?
LTG HODGES: Well —
LTG HODGES: Sure. Since France re-entered the integrated command structure, they’re back in a very serious way. Of course, General Palomeros is the commander of strategic Allied Command Transformation, which is headquartered in Virginia, so he’s one of the two four-star strategic commanders – General Breedlove, of course, at SHAPE is his counterpart. So you’ve got an extremely high-ranking position there, and then we’ve got – the vice chief of staff at SHAPE is a three-star, Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, a French general officer and an extremely influential and important position. In fact, he’s probably the one person at SHAPE that I interact with the most. He’s our biggest champion there, understands and appreciates the importance of land power as part of what the alliance overall does.
So – and then you’ve got senior French officers throughout all the other headquarters. France is the third largest contributor in my headquarters; 10 percent of the headquarters are French positions. So that’s a commitment by France to be back in the alliance, and my senior French officer is my chief of plans – exceptionally talented officer, and he does one of the most important functions that we have in the headquarters.
So at the individual level, those are some examples of where France is fully engaged in what’s going on. We have all been impressed with how French forces operated in Mali, the way they’ve done that, and also they didn’t do that alone. You had a coalition, including U.S., Canada, other nations that supported their operations there that I think are a very positive sign.
France contributes in other ways that are very important. In fact, today, the land component of the NATO Response Force is the French Rapid Reaction Corps that’s based in Lille. So it’s one of the nine corps headquarters that make up what’s known as the NATO force structure. It’s a multinational headquarters, but the framework nation is France. General – Lieutenant General Eric Margail is the commander, he’s been there about a year. So if NATO were to use the NATO Response Force, the NRF, then the lead headquarters on the land would be the French-based French Rapid Reaction Corps. That’s a very important contribution.
The – so in terms of being an important, viable member of the alliance, of course I’d like to see them continue to maintain capacity to help deal with all the different requirements. But in terms of quality, they’re as good as anybody else in the alliance.
MODERATOR: Are there any other questions?
QUESTION: Hi. I’m Anne Walters. I’m with the German press agency DPA (Deutsche Presse Agentur. As the mission in Afghanistan winds down, how would you say that the role of NATO should continue? How would you convince people in the member countries of the ongoing importance of NATO as the ISAF mission winds down?
LTG HODGES: Importance of NATO with regards to Afghanistan? Well, I think the nations have already shown how important that they value this, because there’s no shortage of people volunteering to or nations stepping up to fulfil requirements for the RSM, Resolute Support Mission, which is the follow-on. So I think that – you think of the challenges associated with Afghanistan, that’s impressive to me that so many nations continue to stay willing to invest and do their part all the way up to the end. Certainly, I think we’re all happy and proud to see what Secretary Kerry has done and along with other nations helping to get the two candidates to agree to an outcome. But that – and that was very important. Nations were waiting to see that, and I think the unity, the nation sticking together on that, was an important part of Secretary Kerry being able to help them achieve that outcome.
So I think the nations recognize the transition as the right transition, the training and preparation that’s being done, the leadership that’s being put into place to make that transition from ISAF to Resolute Support. Very professional, solid, and I don’t think that – I don’t think you’re going to see NATO members slipping away from that prematurely.
QUESTION: Hi, I’m Lauri Tankler with the Estonian Public Broadcasting. I just want to follow up the French question about the military and the NATO. How do you as an officer and as a military leader – how do you see the French Government decision to sell the Mistral warships to Russia and to train the Russian troops there?
LTG HODGES: Well, of course that’s a – each nation in an alliance, each nation can make the decisions – they can make sovereign decisions. To the average person on the outside, it’s a little bit difficult to understand that. But I saw where the French minister of defense yesterday talked about within the EU that there are different levels of measures that could be taken as part of the sanctions regime and that so far that the EU had not yet reached that third level, which would’ve obligated France not to sell, to complete the sale of those ships to Russia. So I think – and I’m certainly not the expert on this, but it seems to me that inside France they’re looking at EU rules for sanctions, that EU was not there yet. And so they will continue down along that path.
QUESTION: Thank you. I’d like to come back to Ukraine once more. You’ve mentioned the transformation that NATO is in and the different strategic concept. And I was just wondering, I think one of the reasons for that was obviously, like, the budget constraints. Another one was the realization that adversaries might be different in the future than they used to be. But now with the Ukraine crisis and the realization that Russia is back as an adversary in a way, at least, I was just wondering: Did that cause any rethinking on NATO’s part? Have there been any changes made to the new strategy, or will you just proceed as you planned?
LTG HODGES: Well, I think the – there’s a couple of ways to look at this. First of all, I think a lot of people who have watched Russia over the years are seeing that Russia is what we always thought they were, that this notion that somehow they could be this wonderful partner, like some other European country, was probably not well founded. Absolutely we need to maintain a cooperative relationship with Russia; all the nations do for not just economic reasons or humanitarian reasons, but it’s an extremely important country with a powerful military and potentially powerful economy. So there’s a hundred good reasons to have a good relationship with the Russians, not just to prevent conflict from breaking out.
But the fact is, regardless of what type of government it was, whether it was Czarist Russia, communist Russia, post-Soviet era, and now under President Putin, use of force – their own interpretation of a lot of the legal instruments that are out there in international domain, using those things, information to achieve what it is that they want to achieve. So I think what’s happened in the last few months has kind of reminded people of that.
Now, that doesn’t mean that everybody’s rushing to re-establish armaments industries and start rearming, necessarily. In fact, very few nations have indicated that they’re going to increase defense spending, but we will – we are going to do one thing that the Secretary General and the SACEUR said that we’re going to do even before this started in the life after ISAF is that you’re going to see more robust exercises, because only through exercising can you retain interoperability, and by exercising in those eastern European nations can you demonstrate the assurance and capability that we can get there and that we will be there. And then, frankly, I think that’s also – by demonstrating that capability, that’s – it has a deterrent effect that’s important.
I think that Russia believes that they probably have seven or eight weeks to do something. I don’t mean seven weeks from today. I mean in general, their planning horizon, I think they probably think they have seven or eight weeks to do something before the alliance could actually respond to it. And they don’t act like a chess player, they act like a checkers player. And they see an opportunity, they’ll do it. I think the – there’s a notion of creeping normalcy, which means that they do something, and if the West doesn’t react to it, that that becomes the new norm. I mean, it clearly is the policy of the nations of NATO that Crimea belongs to Ukraine. But candidly, you don’t hear a lot of discussion about how we’re going – what we’re going to do to help restore it to Ukraine. So it’s almost like the boundary has been changed, and now territorial waters in the Black Sea potentially are changed.
Will that be recognized by international courts, shipping, insurance? All those kinds of things is [are] yet to be seen. I hope not, because Crimea is sovereign territory of Ukraine and it’ll be a political solution to restore that.
QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? On the Ukraine, I asked this – the question before and you said that there’s a history of interoperation with the Ukrainian military. Did anything change from the beginning of that crisis in April until now? I mean, is there new input from NATO into the Ukrainian training forces or is there new hardware that is being sent to the Ukraine? Is there anything that has changed since April?
LTG HODGES: I am personally not aware of specific things that have been provided by any nation. What I have seen is a determination to continue with the Rapid Trident exercise in September, which I think is important. I think we’ve had a couple nations that want to join the exercise that maybe weren’t on it before.
Now, this is not a gigantic exercise. It’s just a very few thousand soldiers would be involved. Obviously, it – I think it sends a powerful signal if we do it. But at the end of the day, of course, Ukraine, I mean, they’re the host, and they are very busy right now. The exercise was originally going to be in August, and they – excuse me, in July – and they asked to shift it to September, because to do this exercise and conduct the operations that they were doing at the time would not have been feasible.
I hope that we’re able to conduct this exercise in September because we want to see their – continue to help them improve their capability, which is something we would be doing regardless of whether or not Russia had ever gone into Crimea. This is a normal part of the very robust partnership program that the alliance has with 20-something different nations to help partner nations to continue to improve their capability.
As I mentioned, Ukraine has been part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, other places. So we need them – again, separate from whether or not Russia ever went into Crimea, we need them to be able to operate inside multinational formations because they’re so dependable about going to places to do stability operations or otherwise.
MODERATOR: Are there any further questions? If there are no more questions, this event is now concluded. Thank you all for coming.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesperson
July 14, 2014
Russia’s Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine’s Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability
The United States’ goal throughout the crisis in Ukraine has been to support a democratic Ukraine that is stable, unified, secure both politically and economically, and able to determine its own future. Therefore, we support ongoing dialogue among the foreign ministers from Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia to work toward a sustainable ceasefire by all parties in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine that would build toward a lasting peace. We should emphasize, however, that our ultimate goal is not just a temporary halt to violence. We want Russia to stop destabilizing Ukraine and occupying Crimea, a part of Ukraine’s territory, and allow all of the people of Ukraine to come together to make their own decisions about their country’s future through a democratic political process.
Ukrainian President Poroshenko has proposed a detailed peace plan that includes a promise of amnesty for separatists who laid down their arms voluntarily, and who are not guilty of capital crimes, decentralization of powers within Ukraine, and protection of the Russian language. He also implemented a unilateral ten-day ceasefire on June 20 to create room for a political solution, which unfortunately was not reciprocated by the separatists and their Russian backers.
While Russia says it seeks peace, its actions do not match its rhetoric. We have no evidence that Russia’s support for the separatists has ceased. In fact, we assess that Russia continues to provide them with heavy weapons, other military equipment and financing, and continues to allow militants to enter Ukraine freely. Russia denies this, just as it denied its forces were involved in Crimea — until after the fact. Russia has refused to call for the separatists to lay down their arms, and continues to mass its troops along the Ukrainian border. Many self-proclaimed “leaders” of the separatists hail from Russia and have ties to the Russian government. This all paints a telling picture of Russia’s continued policy of destabilization in eastern Ukraine.
Here are the facts:
• Russia continues to accumulate significant amounts of equipment at a deployment site in southwest Russia. This equipment includes tanks of a type no longer used by the Russian military, as well as armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, and air defense systems. Russia has roughly doubled the number of tanks, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers at this site. More advanced air defense systems have also arrived at this site.
• We are confident Moscow is mobilizing additional tanks that are no longer in the active Russian military inventory from a depot to send to this same deployment site.
• We are concerned much of this equipment will be transferred to separatists, as we are confident Russia has already delivered tanks and multiple rocket launchers to them from this site.
• Available information indicates Moscow has recently transferred some Soviet-era tanks and artillery to the separatists and that over the weekend several military vehicles crossed the border.
• Social media videos of separatist military convoys suggest Russia in the past week alone has probably supplied the militants with at least two-dozen additional armored vehicles and artillery pieces and about as many military trucks.
• Publicly available videos posted on July 14 of a Luhansk convoy on the road to Donetsk revealed at least five T-64 tanks, four BMP-2 armored personnel carriers (APC), BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, three towed antitank guns, two ZU 23-2 antiaircraft guns, and probably a 2B16 mortar.
• A video of Krasnodon, near the Izvaryne border crossing, on 11 July showed two BTR armored personnel carriers, two antitank guns, and various trucks on a road heading in a westerly direction towards Donetsk.
• A video filmed in Donetsk on 11 July showed a convoy of three BMD-2 APCs, two BMPs, one 2S9 self-propelled gun, and a BTR-60 APC.
• In addition, after recapturing several Ukrainian cities last weekend, Ukrainian officials discovered caches of weapons that they assert came from Russia, including MANPADS, mines, grenades, MREs, vehicles, and a pontoon bridge.
• Ukrainian forces have discovered large amounts of other Russian-provided military equipment, including accompanying documentation verifying the Russian origin of said equipment, in the areas they have liberated from the separatists.
• Photographs of destroyed or disabled separatist equipment in eastern Ukraine have corroborated that some of this equipment is coming from Russia.
• Recruiting efforts for separatist fighters are expanding inside Russia and separatists are looking for volunteers with experience operating heavy weapons such as tanks and air defenses. Russia has allowed officials from the “Donetsk Peoples’ Republic” to establish a recruiting office in Moscow.
• Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, who has long had a distinguished career in the Ukrainian military, was taken by separatists in mid-June. She is now being held in a prison in Voronezh, Russia. According to the Ukrainian government, she was transferred to Russia by separatists.
• Separately Russia continues to redeploy new forces extremely close to the Ukrainian border. We have information that a significant number of additional military units are also in the process of deploying to the border.
Ukraine’s Good-Faith Efforts: In a bid to unify the country, President Poroshenko outlined a comprehensive peace plan on June 7. President Poroshenko’s plan offers amnesty to separatists who lay down their arms voluntarily, and who are not guilty of capital crimes; commits to providing a safe corridor for Russian fighters to return to Russia; establishes a job creation program for the affected areas; includes an offer of broad decentralization and dialogue with eastern regions, including the promise of early local elections; and grants increased local control over language, holidays, and customs. President Poroshenko also has reached out to the residents of eastern Ukraine and is pursuing constitutional reform which will give local regions more authority to choose their regional leaders and protect locally-spoken languages.
President Poroshenko implemented a unilateral seven-day (later extended to ten days) unilateral ceasefire on June 20. He also proposed meeting with leaders from eastern Ukraine – including separatists – despite their stated unwillingness to abide by the cease-fire or to negotiate.
Yet Russia and its proxies in Donetsk and Luhansk did not act on this opportunity for peace. Hours after the ceasefire began, Russia-backed separatists wounded nine Ukrainian service members. During the course of the ten-day ceasefire, Russia-backed separatists attacked Ukrainian security forces over 100 times, killing 28 service members. The separatists continue to hold more than 150 hostages, mostly civilians, including teachers and journalists. Separatists have refused all offers by the Ukrainian government to meet.
This timeline of events leading to, during, and after the unilateral Ukraine ceasefire illustrates how the good-faith efforts of the Ukraine government and European leaders to broker a ceasefire with Russia and the separatists it backs have been rejected. Russia and the separatists they are supporting continued to destabilize Ukraine throughout the ceasefire, and continue to destabilize Ukraine today.
• May 25: Petro Poroshenko, who had campaigned on a platform stressing reconciliation with the east and Russia, is elected by an absolute majority of voters in Ukraine.
• June 8-17: President Poroshenko hosts five rounds of contact group talks, facilitated by the OSCE envoy, in the lead-up to his announcement of a ceasefire.
• June 12: Poroshenko initiates a call to President Putin to open communication.
• June 14: EU-brokered gas talks end with a final EU brokered proposal: Ukraine accepts the proposal, but Russia rejected it.
• June 19: Poroshenko meets with eastern Ukrainian leaders, including separatists, in Kyiv.
• June 20: Poroshenko implements a seven-day unilateral ceasefire. Hours later, nine Ukrainian service members are wounded by pro-Russian separatists, foreshadowing separatists’ 100 plus violent actions over the next 10 days.
• June 23: The contact group meets in Donetsk.
• June 25: NATO Secretary General Rasmussen notes that there are “no signs” of Russia respecting its international commitments with regard to Ukraine.
• June 27: Ukraine provides constitutional reform provisions to the Venice Commission for review. This reform would allow for the direct election of governors and for local authorities to confer special status on minority languages within their regions.
• June 27: Poroshenko extends the unilateral ceasefire another 72 hours to allow another chance for OSCE contact group negotiations to show progress.
• June 28: Ukraine shoots down two Russian UAVs violating Ukraine’s airspace in the Luhansk region.
• June 30: Due to the separatists’ refusal to abandon violence in favor of negotiation, President Poroshenko allows the cease-fire to expire.
• July 3: President Poroshenko in a telephone conversation with U.S. Vice President Biden reaffirms that he is ready to begin political negotiations to resolve the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions without any additional conditions.
• July 8: President Petro Poroshenko visits the former rebel stronghold of Slovyansk to meet with local residents after government forces recapture it from pro-Russian separatists.
• July 9: Ukraine restores electricity and train service to Slovyansk, and Ukrainian security forces distribute food, drinking water, and humanitarian aid to the population.
• July 11: The Ukrainian government establishes an inter-agency task force in Slovyansk that is conducting damage, security, and humanitarian needs assessments.
• July 11: The Ukrainian government reports that it delivered over 60 tons of humanitarian aid supplies in Donetsk Oblast over the preceding 24 hours, bringing the five-day total to 158 tons. President Poroshenko announces that Ukrainian security forces had successfully cleared nearly 100 mines and roadside bombs from liberated territory.
As General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, stated on July 1: “The cease fire in Ukraine was not ended because of accusations; it was ended because Russian-backed separatists responded with violence while President Poroshenko tried to open a window for peace. Russia’s commitment to peace will be judged by its actions, not its words.” As the United States and our European allies have repeatedly stated, we call on the Russian government to halt its material support for the separatists, to use its influence with the separatists to push them to lay down their arms and abide by a ceasefire and to release all hostages. Only then can the process of bringing peace to Ukraine truly begin.
A Chronicle of My Peace Corps Service in Uganda, beginning in June 2014. This blog is a reflection of my own personal experiences and opinions and are in no way intended to represent the views of the Peace Corps or United States Government.
A Chronicle of My Peace Corps Service in Uganda, beginning in June 2014. This blog is a reflection of my own personal experiences and opinions and are in no way intended to represent the views of the Peace Corps or United States Government.
A Chronicle of My Peace Corps Service in Uganda, beginning in June 2014. This blog is a reflection of my own personal experiences and opinions and are in no way intended to represent the views of the Peace Corps or United States Government.